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The main result of  this paper characterizes possibly non-symmetric strategy-proof 
and efficient choice functions as Perfectly  Competitive. Efficiency is  defined as im- 
possibility of  improvement by reallocation of  cornrnodi  ty among finite sets of  agents, 
and largeness of  the economy is captured by a weak aggregation-condition called "lo- 
cal separability".  Individual  rationality constraints with respect  to an assignment 
of  endowments  imply  that the resulting allocations must  be Walrasian relative to 
the assignment of  endowments. The exact, local approach combined with a normal- 
ity assumption on the domain of  preferences allows the proofs to remain elementary 
throughout. 1. INTRODUCTION 
Since Adam Smith's praises of  the Invisible Hand, mainstream economics has been 
engaged in a love affair with the ability of  idealized competitive markets to system- 
atically yield efficient outcomes in a decentralized fashion.  Decentralization has been 
understood as economy of  information transmission and as incentive compatibility of 
information generation. The pioneering work of  Hurwicz (1972) has made the second 
aspect accessible to rigorous micro-economic analysis; in particular, the question can 
be  posed whether the privileged place of  competitive markets both in  theory and 
empirical reality can be accounted for in these terms, or whether there exist other 
"mechanisms" that combine efficiency with incentive compatibility. 
It is  well-known  that in  economies with a finite number  of  agents, price-taking 
is  not fully incentive compatible, and that strategy-proofness and efficiency cannot 
coexist1.  On the other hand, in  "large" economies in which agents are infinitesimal, 
price-taking is incentive compatible; Walrasian equilibrium becomes genuine Perfect 
competition2. A large economy is therefore the natural setting to investigate the en- 
tire class of  mechanisms that reconcile incentive compatibility and efficiency. Indeed, 
following Hammond  (1979), the literature has obtained a number of  results which 
characterize  Walrasian  allocations as  the outcomes of  strategy-proof  and efficient 
mechanisms. 
The present paper goes beyond the existing literature by considering general non- 
symmetric mechanisms satisfying an aggregation condition called "local separability". 
By contrast, the literaturefhas focused on characterizing  "envy-free" allocations as 
the equilibrium outcomes of  symmetric mechanisms.  Allowing for a-symmetries in 
'Except  in very special circumstances. 
2This point has been emphasized particularly by Ostroy and Makowski. the mechanism is important conceptual.ly,  for the basic intuition behind the privileged 
place attributed to the competitive mechanism -  that in order to achieve efficiency in 
an incentive compatible way, private opportunity costs have to agree with social op- 
portunity costs3 - has nothing to do with symmetry of  the mechanism.  Furthermore, 
absence of symmetry may easily allow for qualitatively different incentive compatible 
mechanisms; this is the case in finite exchange economies, where for instance "serial 
dictatorships" (a la Satterthwaite-Sonnenschein (1981)) are inherently asymmetric.* 
Asymmetry is also of  interest also from a mechanism-design  perspective which asks 
whether and when lump-sum transfers (redistribution without loss of  first-best effi- 
ciency) are feasible in  the presence of  private information.  Non-symmetric  mecha- 
nisms arise here when some of  the criteria relevant to the evaluation of  an allocation 
are observable; an example would be income subsidies based on observable  handicap^.^ 
As a consequence of  our main result, it, will be shown that if resources are privately 
owned, incentive compatible redistribution of  income will generally result in a loss 
of  first-best efficiency, even if it is based on observable non-preference characteristics 
(Theorem 2 in section 5). 
Using a  measure-based definition  of  Pareto efficiency (on which an allocation is 
Pareto efficient if it is not possible to make a set of  agents of  strictly positive measure 
better off  without making a set of  agents of  positive measure worse off), the litera- 
ture has remained silent on  non-symmetric mechanisms, perhaps because strategy- 
proofness is almost without force in this context (see observation 1 following Theorem 
3See section 4 for more details. 
4~arbera-~ackson  (1995) also, suggest that non-symmetric mechanisms may ddfer substantially 
from symmetric ones and may be of  independent interest. 
5~e  note that to  a limited extent, non-symmetries can be  captured by conventional approaches; 
what is needed is that there is a finite number of observably distinct types such that the  distribution 
of characteristics within each type satisfies the required connectedness or richness assumptions. 2); this seems counterintuitive and moreover clearly off  the mark as an approximate 
characterization of  what happens in large finite economies.  A more satisfactory re- 
sult can be achieved by defining an efficiency criterion which takes individual agents 
seriously.  To this effect, the concept of  "Finite Consumption Efficiency" (FCE) is 
introduced in section 3. FCE requires that it must not be feasible to make a finite set 
of  agents strictly better off  by a reallocation of  commodities among them that leaves 
the allocation of  outside agents untouched. 
The concept of  finite consumption efficiency is akin to that of  a "finite core" devel- 
oped by Kaneko and Wooders (see, in particular, Kaneko and Wooders (1986) as well 
as Hammond, Kaneko and Wooders (1988) and of  "multilateral incentive compatibility" 
(see Hammond (1987)), as is  the underlying philosophy  of  taking individual agents 
seriously. Indeed, as Kaneko and Wooders point out, in some contexts such as assign- 
ment games, it seems hard to conceive of  a meaningful alternative to a finite approach; 
incentive compatibility is another inherently individualistic non-cooperative concept. 
The setting of an "effectively large" economy is captured by an assumption of  "local 
separability" which requires that an agent's consumption does not depend on changes 
in the characteristics of a finite number of  other agents.  As shown in section 3, FCE 
combined  with local separability  implies  under  regularity assumptions  that agents 
are "shadow-price takers". These two conditions define thereby an "exact" approach 
to the study of  efficient allocations in large economies that may be helpful in other 
contexts. 
Section 4 contains the central result; of  the paper, a characterization of  strategy- 
/ 
proof, locally separable and finitely consurnption-efficient choice functions as Perfectly 
Competitive. The result assumes a domain of  preferences with normal demand f~nctions.~ 
6A prior, non-elementary result  based on  normal preferences has  been obtained by Mas-Collel 
(1  987). The normality assumption gives rise to a proof whose simplicity matches the essen- 
tial simplicity of  the underlying econornic argument; in particular, we do not need to 
employ the rather heavy mathematical machinery involved in standard proofs which 
typically rely on topological measure spaces of  smooth preferences (cf.  Champsaur- 
Laroque (l98l),  Mas-Colell (1985)).7 
In  proposing an exact approach to the study of  large economies, we  do not mean 
to  deny the legitimacy of  the measure-theoretic one. Rather, the present paper shows 
that an exact approach can improve on measure-theoretic ones in two ways: first, as 
illustrated by Theorem 2, exact finitary conditions such as FCE may have substantial 
extra bite.  In addition, in  the context of  this paper an exact approach reduces the 
role of  measure-theoretic infrastructure  to a  minimum  (it enters here only in  the 
definition of  feasibility), and thereby purifies the economic logic of  the argument. (A 
more detailed justification of  the joint use of  exact and measure-theoretic notions is 
offered in section 7.) 
That the measure-theoretic  approach is not altogether complete has been argued 
in the literature in a somewhat indirect ,way via the claim that for a continuum econ- 
omy to be economically meaningful, it must be a well-defined limit of large economies, 
hence regular (cf. Champsaur-Laroque (1982), Makowski-Ostroy (1992)). We observe 
in section 6 that this line of  argument, in conjunction with a measure-theoretic de- 
finition  of  consumption efficiency, in  fact entails FCE. However, a downside of  this 
"asymptotic approach" is that existence (for example of  regular Walrasian  equilib- 
rium) becomes  at best generic.  To  the degree one attaches intrinsic intelligibility 
and interest to infinite econotnies, the weaker exact approach seems preferable, since 
it does not create difficulties with existence, and since its defining conditions, local 
'lndeed,  the starting point of  this paper was the attempt to  explain the essence of the  standard 
results without the use of  measure-theory to my  graduate-students. separability  and finite consumption efficiency, can  be motivated  self-sufficiently in 
infinite economies. 
The plan of  the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the choice-functional frame- 
work of  the paper, with particular emphasis on the notion of  a  "neighborhood of 
economies" ("local domain").  Section  3 introduces the methodologically distinctive 
assumptions of the present paper, local separability and hite  consumption efficiency. 
The main result of the paper, a characterization of possibly non-symmetric Perfectly 
Competitive choice functions, is demonstrated in section 4.  As  shown in section 5, 
in the presence of  individual rationality constraints the result implies strong restric- 
tions on allocations; these implications are not obtainable with a measure-theoretic 
definition of  efficiency. 
The last two sections provide further support for the exact approach.  Section 6 
discusses  the difference between exact and measure-theoretic efficiency concepts; in 
particular, it is argued that FCE is sound also from an asymptotic point of  view which 
views infinite economies as limiting de,scriptions of  large finite economies.  Section 7 
deals with conceptual issues concerning the definition of  feasibility  and efficiency in 
large economies; in particular, they explain how  FCE is consistent  with a measure- 
theoretic definition of  feasibility. 
2. FRAMEWORK AND NOTATION 
In the following, a "socia1,choice" approach to resource allocation in (large) private good 
economies is undertaken.  Individual agents i E  I are described by their preferences 
over allocations f = (fi)i,,  ,which, in a private goods context, can be identified with 
preferences over commodity bundles x E R:.  I will assumed to be infinite unless oth- 
erwise specified.  Resource scarcity is described by  the requirement that allocations have to be feasible, i.e., that f  E F  C  RYI, where F is endowed with appropriate 
structure to reflect the private goods environment.  A hallmark of  the social choice 
approach is the absence of  individual endowments in the description of  the economy. 
Information about these may be added -  for instance, in order to impose individual 
rationality constraints, - but doing so is optional. 
This is an interestingly  different perspective on  competitive  "Walrasian" alloca- 
tions, in that many of  our standard conceptions about the central role of  competitive 
allocations are derived from an environment in  which private property rights are al- 
ready well-specified. These intuitions have found their deepest and most developed 
expression in  the "core-equivalence Theorems" for large economies.  By contrast, an 
axiomatization of  competitive allocatians in  the more abstract social choice frame- 
work provides eo ips0 an account of  the role of  claims to private property implicit in 
the definition of  a Walrasian allocation. 
An agent  i is described by a preference relation h  on Re, (= {x E Re+  lx > 0)). 
Throughout, preferences F are assumed to be asymmetk, monotone ( x > y implies 
x h  y ) and such that the sets  {yl y + x) are convex and open in R:  for every x E Rt. 
They are also assumed to lead to well-defined choices from budget sets, i.e., denoting 
"jp,m;>):={xER:lp.x~m,  andfornoy~R:suchthatp.y~rn:  y~x), 
it is assumed that i#~ (p,rn; +)  is non-empty whenever p >>  0 and m > 0. Throughout, 
prices are normalized to have Euclidean norm 1; i.e. p  E S:  = {x E R:  I I/x/l  = 1,  x > 0) , 
and oftenp E S:+  = {x E R:lllx/  = 1x  >>  0). 
Let P  denote a class of  such relations.  An allocation is a mapping f : I -+ Re, (and 
may be viewed as an elemeht of  R?').  An  economy is a mapping E : I +  7'. 
In this paper, the feasible set F is held fixed and plays only a subordinate role. An 
economy can thus be identified with its preference profile. We  will consider domains 
D  of  economies that are closed under changes of  the preferences of  single agents. Definition 1 I' -- E if  E and E'  difler in at most a finite number of  individuals, i.e., 
if  #{i  E I  I  E(i) # E1(i)) < co. V  5  PI  is locally closed if  E E V  and E'  N I  imply 
E'  E 23. A  locally closed V  is a local d.omain if  El  E'  E V  imply & -- &'. 
Local domains ("neighborhoods of  economies") are the equivalence classes [El de- 
fined by -;  sometimes, to highlight the role of  P in defining this equivalence class, 
we will also write [E; PI.  Note that [I]  = PI  if and only if I is finite.  If I is infinite, 
economies in the same local domain are only microscopically different, and -- can be 
interpreted as relation of  macroscopic  tquiualence. 
A choice function C maps economies to allocations, C : V  --t Ryl.  C is assumed 
to be a proper function, that is:  to be non-empty and single-valued.  Properties of 
allocations such as efficiency and individual rationality are understood to determine 
analogous properties of  choice function:; economy by economy. 
In  the following, choice functions defined on local domains can  be viewed as the 
proper object of study.  We  will argue in section  3 that the notion of  Perfect Com- 
petition  is  naturally defined  in  those  terms;  moreover,  all  properties  used  in  its 
characterization will be local, concerning either one economy at a  time (efficiency 
and individual rationality properties) or changes in the preferences of  a finite num- 
ber of  agents (strategy-proofness in section 4 and "local separability" in section 3). 
Choice functions defined  on  local domains might  well  turn out  to be the natural 
object of  study also in other future investigations of  axiomatic resource allocation. 
In  a large private goods economy,  it is natural and standard to assume that an 
agent's consumption depends only on hiis characteristics and the macroscopic features 
of  the economy  (see, for  instance, Harnmond  (1979) and Dubey-Mas Colell-Shubik (1980)). A weak version of  this is to require that any agent's consumption be inde- 
pendent of  any variation in the characteristics of  a finite number of  individuals, as in 
the following 
Axiom 1 (Local Separability)  For all E,  El  E 27,  I(i)  = I
1(i) and I -  E1 imply 
C(E)  (i)  = C  (El)  (2). 
Note that on a local domain, C is locally separable if and only if  E(i)  = I'(i)  implies 
C(E)  (i)  = C(E1)  (i). In this case, the choice function can be represented as a collection 
of  individual choice functions (Ct)2EI,  with C
i : P -, R:. 
Local separability helps ensure that a single agent's  characteristics have no influ- 
ence on shadow prices, that is:  no effect on  the relative scarcity of  different goods. 
Moreover, in a strategic context, local separability of  the choice function is the natural 
result of  local separability of the underlying mechanism (analogously defined). This 
is analyzed in more detail in Nehring (1998) which also shows that Nash behavior in 
locally separable mechanisms induces strategy-proof choice functions. 
In the context of  choice functions defined on local domains, merely "approximate" 
criteria of  efficiency  are inadequate; a.  property $J  is approximate if f satisfies $J  in 
&  whenever  f  satisfies  $ in  some --equivalent  El.  Clearly, all  measure-theoretic 
efficiency concepts are approximate. 
Approximate concepts are inadequate, since by definition they are irresponsive to 
changes of   references within [I].  Hence, any locally constant choice function that 
yields an "approximately efficient" allocation in some economy E yields approximately 
efficient allocations  throughout the local domain  [El. Moreover, intuitively obvious 
Pareto improvements are missed by these concepts, such as the possibility that two 
agents improve by exchanging their commodity bundles.  In their stead, we  propose 
the following exact, finitary one. Axiom 2 (Finite Consumption Efficiency)  The allocation f satisfies FCE if for 
no g  E R?'  and no finite set J c I such that gi  = fi  for all i E I\J,  C gi  = C f,, 
and g, +, fi  for all i E J. 
In  words:  For f  to satisfy FCE, it must not  be feasible  to make a  finite set of 
agents strictly better off  by a reallocation  of  commodities among them that leaves 
the allocation of  outside agents untouched.' 
Remark.  Under the maintained assumptions on preferences, FCE can be shown
g 
to be equivalent to the existence of  a price vector p E  S:+  supporting every agent's 
consumption. Thus, FCE can be viewed as equivalent to consumption efficiency for 
reallocations among groups of  agents of  arbitmy size; in  particular, it implies the 
absence of  improving reallocations among groups of  traders with  positive  measure 
(i.e. pCE which is formally defined in section 5). For further extensive discussion of 
the status and content of  FCE, see sections 6 and 7. 
It  seems  natural to expect  that  FCE  combined  with  local separability  implies 
"shadow-price  taking",  i.e., independence of  shadow  prices  from  variations in any 
agent's  preferences.  This property will  be crucial  for  the subsequent  substantive 
8 
results. 
Definition 2  C is uniformly supported  on [&,PI  by p E S:  if,  for all i E I 
andall+~P,  C(+,&-i)(i)E#@,pbC(+,&-,)(i);+). 
The following example shgws that shadow-price taking , i.e., uniform supportedness 
is not implied by local separability by itself. 
'FCE  can also be interpreted as a renegotirrtion-proofnness  condition, weakening Gale (1980) and 
Harnmond's (1987) "multilateral  incentive-compatibility" condition. 
'With  the help of Tychonoff's theorem. Example 1  Let P = {F~}~~(~,~)~  +a being  representable by a utility function  Ua 
with Ua(xl,  x2)  = max(xl -  l,O)Q  max(:x2 -  1,  0)'-a  +  max(rnin(xl,  x2),  1). 
Consider any local domain V  5  PI. 
Define C by Ci'(+) = (2,2)  V  +E PI  and Ci(%)  = (1,l) V  +E P, i # i*. 
C is locally separable and FCE. However, each & E l7  has a unique supporting price 
(a0,l-a*) 
ll(a*J-~*)ll  determined by &(i*)  = +a'. 
Some regularity conditions are needed to obtain the desired conclusion.  The first 
will  play a  crucial role in  the proof  of  the main  result  of  the paper.  It is  essen- 
tially a geometric version of  standard smoothness  (C2) conditions.  For the purpose 
of  immediate interest, proposition 1, though, the condition is clearly stronger than 
necessary. 
Define the "radius of  curvature" of  the upper contour set of  + at x E Re,+ by 
p(x, +)  := sup {r I  3p E S:+  : {z  I r % r}  3 Br(rp  +  x) + R:}  , 
with sup 0 = 0 by convention. 
Axiom 3  (Uniform Smoothness) 
For all y > 0, inf  {~(x,  S)  I+€ P,  x E R:+  : Ix/l 2  > 0. 
Remark.  The clause  "11x11  2  y" has been inserted to allow for arbitrarily small 
curvature radii near the origin; those come about easily, as for instance in the case of 
Cobb-Douglas preferences. 
.  To exploit the smoothness of  preferences, a regularity assumption on the choice 
/ 
function is also needed. 
Definition 3  A  choice  function C is weakly interior if, for every economy E E D 
there are at least two agents il,  i2 E  I  and two preference  relations  +i,,  F~,E  P  such 
that C(F~~,  Lik)(ik)  >>  0 fo~  k = 1,2. Proposition 1  If  a  locally  separable,  weakly interior ch,oice function C  on a  uni- 
formly smooth domain D  satisfies FCE, then C is uniformly supported on every local 
subdomain [El  D. 
Proof.  W.l.o.g., 2)  is a local domain.  Under  the assumptions on C and D, there 
exist at least two agents i17  i2 E I and preference relations  +i,, ki,E P such  that 
Cik(>ik)  is uniquely supported by pk, k = 1,2. By FCE, pl = p2 =: p. For any j E I 
and >E P,  there exists £  E D  such that £(j) = + and £(ik)  = kik,  for  k = 1 or 
k = 2. Assume, w.1.o.g.  that &(il)  = ki,. In  view of  the openness of  preferences, 
the convexity of  both + and  ki, and  the unique supportedness of  Cil  (+i,)  by p, 
it follows from  FCE via a standard separation argument that p supports Cj(+) as 
well. 
4.  A CHARACTERIZATION OF PERFECTLY COMPETITIVE 
CHOICE FUNCTIONS 
It is a major advantage of  infinite models of  economic resource allocation that they 
endow the notion of  "price taking" with real rather than merely approximate meaning. 
To emphasize the difference to the finite case, such allocations and choice functions 
are sometimes referred to as "Perfectly Competitive" rather than merely "Walrasian"  , 
a usage which we  will foll~w.'~  Perfect Competition as effective price taking is natu- 
rally expressed in local  choice-functional terms: the value of  an agent's consumption 
(his shadow  income)  evaluated at constant shadow-prices  remains constant  as his 
preferences change. This is captured by the following definition. 
'O~his  distinction has been emphasized especially in the work of Ostroy and Makowski. Definition 4 C : V -+ R~+XI  is Perfectly Competitive if, for all local  subdomains 
V'  c V, there exists a price vector p  E S$  and  an income assignment 7n  : I  --t R+ 
such that C(&)(i)  E &(p,  m(i);  (f(i))  for. all & E V' and i E I. 
Roughly put, the definition requires that all agents maximize preferences subject to 
a given income and common prices which they do not influence.  Note that it permits 
an agents'  income to depend on macroscopic features of  the economy in  arbitrary 
ways. 
Note also that on a domain of smooth preferences with single-valued demand functions, 
any FCE allocation f in an economy £ uniquely extends to a Perfectly Competitive 
choice function C which  is furthermore locally separable.  As  a  result, existence of 
Perfectly Competitive choice functions on a local domain consistent with a given al- 
location of  property rights (cf.  section  5)  is ensured by the existence of  competitive 
equilibria in one of  its economies. 
While common supporting prices originate in efficiency conditions, it is natural to 
look for an axiomatic basis for the givenness of an agent's income in incentive compatibility 
properties, in particular strategy-proofness which amounts to requiring that an agen- 
t's  consumption  maximize his  preferences  subject  to a  given  budget constraint (of 
arbitrary shape); the task of  the mathematical argument is to show that under ap- 
propriate assumptions, the budget constraint must be linear. 
Axiom 4  (Strategy-proofness) 
For no E  E V, i E I and no F  E P  :  C(+,  &-,)  (2)  F  C(£)  (2) 
/ 
Remark.  While in finite settings strategy-proofness characterizes implementabil- 
ity in dominant strategy equilibrium, in infinite settings it is of  much broader applica- 
bility.  In the latter, strategy-proofness  is entailed by Nash equilibrium behavior in "locally separable  mechanism^"^', and by Bayesian Nash equilibria with independent 
types.  For symmetric mechanisms, these claims are straightforward and well-known; 
they are shown to generalize to non-symmetric mechanisms in Nehring (1998). 
Are strategy-proof and efficient  ch.oice functions  Perfectly Competitive as indi- 
cated? Intuition suggests that if strategy-proof choice functions are to  systematically 
lead to efficient allocations, private incentives have to be aligned with social oppor- 
tunity costs. Since in a large private goods economy social opportunity costs can be 
measured in terms of  shadow  prices that are independent of  any particular agent's 
characteristics, such an alignment occurs if and only if  the value of  an agent's con- 
sumption evaluated at these prices is constant, i.e., if the choice function is Perfectly 
Competitive. 
The intuition also suggests that the key to the desired characterization result is 
sufficient richness of  the domain P of  preferences an agent might have; this is exactly 
what Theorem 1  below  delivers.  In  a.greement with  the above intuition, however, 
neither symmetry nor the distribution of  preferences in the actual economy matter. 
As  described, the present situation pa.rallels that of  the characterization of  Groves 
mechanisms, both in terms of  the intuition commonly presented and in terms of the 
formal structure of  the characterization (see Green and Laffont (1977) and Holmstrom 
(1979)) which also makes assumptions on the domain of  preferences only.  By con- 
trast, the literature on the subject (Harnrnond (lgi'g),  Champsaur-Laroque (1981) 
and others) is restricted to characterizing the allocations resulting from symmetric 
mechanisms, and hinges onfstrong assumptions on the distribution of  preferences in 
the economy.  The only exception  to the latter seems  to be Makowski and Ostroy 
(1992)12. 
"Defined analogously to locally separable choice-functions 
12See also section 6. The relevant richness condition is a connectedness assumption, a simplified version 
of  standard ones.  For  its statement, we  need to define a family  of  metrics on the 
domain of  preferences; let 
Axiom 5  (Lipschitz Connectedness) For all s,  FIE  P  and all p,  m there exists 
a mapping h :  [O, 11  --t P  and  L < oo such that i) h(0) =>, ii) h(1)  =+I,  and iii) 
d(pyE)(h(t),  h(tl)) < L. I t -  t'  I for all t,  t'  E [O, I]. 
In contrast to most of  the literature, we will finally assume that preferences generate 
normal demand behavior.  This simplifies the proof significantly. 
Note  that  normality  implies  single-valuedness  of  the  demand  functions  @(..,  5 
). To avoid  technicalities  associated  with  boundary consumptions,  we  will assume 
choice functions to be interior. 
Definition 5  C is interior if, for all 2:  E D  and all i E I,  C(£)(i) >> 0. 
Theorem 1  Consider a  locally  closed  domain of  economies D  C_ P'  such that P 
is normal, uniformly smooth and  Lzpschitz connected.  An interior choice  function 
defined on such D  is  Perfectly Competitive if and only if it is locally separable, FCE 
and stmtegy-proof.  1 
Proof. 
Necessity of  FCE and strategy-proofness is clear; that of  local separability follows 
from the single-valuedness of demand functions entailed by the definition of  normality. For sufficiency, note first  that from the nature of  the claim, it is without loss of 
generality to assume D  to be a local domain, i.e. to be of the form [I].  By Proposition 
1, the assumptions of  the theorem ensure the existence of a uniformly supporting price 
vector p*  E S:  , hence by the monotonicity of  preferences in fact p*  E S:+. Using the 
notation of  section 2, it thus needs to be shown that for all i E I,  the agents' shadow 
income p*  - Ct(+)  is constant as a function of  +E P. Thus, fix some i E I. 
The following mathematical fact plays the role of  the envelope theorem in standard 
in very rough terms, it can be viewed as a non-infinitesimal version thereof. 
It is Illustrated in figure 1. 
Lemma 1  Given p E S:+  and r > 0,  there exist E > 0 and  K  < oo such that for all 
w E R'  and y E Re,, 
i)p.w=O, 
ii) IIw 11  5 E  and 
iii) y + w f (Br(rp)  + R:) 
imply IIYII  L Kllw1I2. 
Proof. See appendix. 
I  Figure 1 about here 1 
The key to the proof is the following lemma which shows that preferences close to 
each other receive similar shadow incomes; the rest is mathematics. 
/ 
Let m(~)  := p* . C'(+)  for  +-E P. 
Lemma 2  There exist  E*  > 0  and  K" < oo such that  for any t,  t'~  P  satisfying 
d(~',m(*))  (+,  +I) <  -  &*  : 
lm (9)  -  m (F)  1  5 K*  [d@*lm(+))  (+,  +I)] 2. Proof.  Take any +'E  P,  and set y*  := mink<[  - Ci(>') > 0 (by interiority). Note 
that in fact for any +E  P,  IICi (+)  11  _>  y*  by strategy-proofness and the monotonicity 
of preferences. By the interiority of the choice function and uniform smoothness, there 
exists r* > 0  such that 
{Z  I  z + Ci (+)I 2 B'*(T*~* + ci  (s))  + R:  for all  +E P.  (1) 
For p  = p*  and r  = r*,  fix some E =: E* and K  =: K* from lemma 1. 
Consider +,  +'E  P such that d(p*'"(>))  (+, +')  5 E*. 
Let  a::= C"(+),  w:=4(p*,rn(+);+')-x,  and y:= Ci(+')  -4(p*,m(+);+r); 
thus Ca(+')  = x  +  w  + y. 
By strategy-proofness and (I), 
C' (Sf)  = x  + w + y $ B"  (x  + r*p*)  + Re,  , which implies 
Similarly, strategy-~roofness  and (1) yields Ci (F)  = x  $ B"  (x  + w + y + r*~*)  + 
R:,  which implies 
By the normality of  F',  y 2  0  or  y <_  0. If  y > 0,  application of  lemma 1  to (2) 
yields  llyll  < d(p'trn(>))  (+,  51)~  -  K*.  If  y < 0,  application of  lemma 1 to (3)  yields 
the same inequality. Since also  Ip* . C'  (+I) -  p* . Ci  (+)I  =  Ip*  . yl  5  llYll  , the claim 
follows. 0 
Fix now +*,  and let M = p*  C
i (t)  + (E*)~  . Kt. 
Take >**E P such that d(p.3")  (+*,  +**) 5 E*.  By Lipschitz  connectedness, there 
exist L < oo and a mapping h  : [O,l]  -+ P  such that i) h(0)  =+*, ii) h(1)  =+**, and 
iii) d(~'>~)(h(t),  h(t
r))  5 La  I  t -  tr  I  for all t,  t'  E [O,  I]. For any natural number n > LIE*, 
by lemma 2. 
Since this inequality holds for arbitrary sufficiently large n, it follows that in fact 
rn (t**)  = rn (t  *)  for any t*,  t**E  P within E*  of  each other. 
Finally, since  Lipschitz  Connectedness implies ordinary path-connectedness, this 
conclusion extends to arbitrary k*,  t**  E P. 
Remark 1. Compared to typical results in the literature such as that of Champsaur- 
Laroque (1981), Theorem 1 is stronger in not assuming transitivity and completeness 
of  preferences. It is weaker, on the other hand, in assuming normality of  the induced 
demand function.  Mas-Cole11 (1987) also assumes normality, and replaces connected- 
ness by a global richness assumption on preferences. 
Remark 2. The main advantage of  using normality lies in  the resulting simplifi- 
cation of  the proof.  The present proof is elementary, while those in the literature rely 
on  rather heavy mathematical machinery such  as topological spaces of  preferences 
and measures thereon. 
More substantively, its non-infinitesimal approach suggests the robustness of  the 
result  to various  infinitary assumptions.  A  particularly  interesting type of  result 
can be obtained by  translating Theorem 1 into a result about Pareto efficient and 
envy-free allocations, in whi,ch case F  is  to be interpreted as the set of  preferences 
of  some agent in the actual economy  &. The proof of  Theorem 1 allows one to show 
for finite economies that if the set of  actual preferences is "almost connected", then 
the allocation must be "almost equal-income
7' Walrasian.  A rough outline of  the key 
steps of  such a proof along the lines of  Theorem 1 are given now . To obtain  some bound at all on  the difference between  the supporting incomes 
of any two agents, it must be possible to connect their consumptions  by a  path of 
consumption bundles of  other agents whose longest link does not exceed a bound E** 
in length; the value of  the bound is determined via lemma 1 by a lower bound on the 
curvature radius of  any agent's preferences. 
If  this condition is satisfied, the difference between the supporting incomes of any 
two agents can be bounded by a "connectedness distance" of  the allocation multiplied 
by a  proportionality factor K**;  the relevant  connectedness distance between  their 
consumption  bundles is  defined as the shortest  "path length" between the bundles, 
the path length in terms being given by the sum of  the squared Euclidean distances 
of adjacent  consumption  bundles.  As  in  the proof of  Theorem 1, bounds on the 
distances between consumption bundles can be replaced by bounds on the distances 
between preferences. 
5. PROPERTY RIGHTS IN AN EXCHANGE ECONOMY 
It  is  clear  and has been  observed above  that  any finitely consumption-efficient 
allocation can be extended to a Perfectly Competitive choice function; thus, strategy- 
proofness alone fails to impose additional restrictions on efficient resource allocation 
in  any given economy.  This may change quite dramatically, however, if  additional 
conditions are imposed.  As an example, consider participation constraints based on 
property rights. 
Let w : I +  R',  denote an allocation of  property rights, with wi  representing 
the commodity bundle agent i is entitled to, i's endowment. 
Axiom 7 f  is individually rational with respect to w, if, for no i E I,  wi +i  fi. 
Individual  rationality has maximal bite if the domain of preferences is "compre- 
18 hensive" rather than merely connected.13 
Axiom 8  A  domain of  preferences P is comprehensive if it contains a subdomain 
Q  that is normal, uniformly smooth, Lipschitx convected  and  has the property that 
for every x E  Re,+ and p E  S:,,  there exists >E Q  such that {z  E Re,  I  z + x) C 
{ZER:  Ip.z>p.x). 
-  Comprehensiveness requires of  Q that it  contain, for every strictly positive con- 
sumption bundle x and every strictly positive price vector p, a preference relation + 
that has p as its "gradient of  preference". 
The bite of  individual rationality constraints is further enhanced if all resources are 
privately owned.  This is easiest  expressed  using some measure-theoretic formalism 
(in a rather loose way; the technical details are entirely standard and omitted). 
Let p  denote a non-atomic measure on  the space of  agents.  Private ownership of 
resources is expressed by the following feasibility condition. 
Axiom 9 f  is feasible with respect to w if  J fdp 5 J  wdp. 
Under these assumptions, individual rationality constraints imply that agents are 
effectively entitled to the full value of  their endowments. 
Definition 6 f  is Walrasian  with respect  to w  if, for  some p  E  S:  and  p-a.e. 
i E  11  fi  E $(P,P.W~,&(~))- 
Theorem 2  Consider a choice function C on  a locally closed domain V such that P 
is comprehensive and such that C  restricted to 2)  n Q'  is interior. If C  is locally sep- 
arable, FCE, strategy-proof  and individually rational as well as privately feasible with 
respect  to the allocation of  property rights w,  then for all & E  V,  C(&)  is Walrasian 
with respect to w. 
13Mas-Colell  (1  987) uses a condition with similar flavor 
19 Proof. W.l.o.g., assume D to  be a local domain. Begin by considering the restriction 
of  C to 27  n Q'  denoted by C.  By Theorem 1, C is Perfectly Competitive for some 
price vector  p*  and income assignment m*.  Let  Hp*,w  := {Z E R:  I  p* . z = w). 
By comprehensiveness and interiority, for every i E I, {c  (s)  I s  E  Q)  =Hp.,m.(i)  fl 
Re,+. 
Hence by individual rationality and monotonicity of preferences (as well as uniform 
smoothness to deal with non-interior wi), m*  (i)  _>  p*  - wi, for every i E I. 
By private feasibility, this implies m*(i)  =  p*  - wi for p-a.e. i E I. 
The claim of the theorem follows from showing that 
To  verify this, note that by  monotonicity  of  preferences and strategy-proofness, 
{C
i(t)  I+E  P)  nR!++  G  Hp.,m-(i),  as well as {Ci(+)  It€  P)  C.{z E Re,  I p*  .z 2  w). 
Finally, {C'(S)  ISE  P)  \ Re,+  c  {z  E Re,  1  p* . z 2 w), by monotonicity of  prefer- 
ences, strategy-proofness and uniform smoothness.  W 
Theorem 2 does not appear to have an equivalent in the literature.  This may be 
due to the fact that if FCE is replaced by a conventional measure-theoretic (hence ap- 
proximate) efficiency criterion such as pCE (about to be defined), strategy-proofness 
has no force at all. 
Axiom 10  An allocation f  satisfies pCE if, for no g  such that Jg  dp  =  f  dp  : 
p(gi ti  fi) > 0 and p(gi ti  fi  OT gi = fi) =  1. 
/ 
Observation 1  Suppose f is an allocatioiz in  & that is  pCE and individually rational 
with respect to w. Let P be any domain of  preferences containing {&(i)  I  i E I). Then 
there exists a choice  function C on [E,  PI  that is locally separable and strategy-proof 
as well as pCE and individually rational with respect to w on [&,PI. wi  if wi  t fi 
Proof. Define C
i by Ci (t  ) = 
fi  otherwise 
\ 
It is easily verified that the resulting C has all properties claimed for it. 
6. FINITE VERSUS MEASURE-THEORETIC EFFICIENCY 
In  terms of  assumptions, besides local separability, the principal departure of  this 
paper from the literature has been  the replacement of  a measure-theoretic concept 
of  efficiency by a finite one.  This move leads to results that do not depend on the 
particular mathematization of  infinity chosen, and which can be proved by elementary 
means. Beyond these "intended consequences, Theorem 2 shows that the obtainable 
results can be much stronger. The following remarks describe and try to account for 
this difference. 
First, it should be noted that, viewed from within an infinite model, the difference 
between the two efficiency concepts is substantive, not merely technical:  FCE corre- 
sponds to an exact, pCE to an approximate version of  consumption efficiency. This 
is seen  more clearly  if pCE is  reformulated - under our monotonicity assumptions 
equivalently - as the following condition: 
FO~~O~ER?':  Jgdp</  fdp  and  git,  fiforal1iEI. 
Thus, an allocation satisfies  pCE if it  is  not  possible to reallocate consumption 
bundles among agents in a way that leaves them as well off  as before  while saving 
an amount of  resources  that  is significant  in the  aggregate.  As an  "approximate" 
efficiency concept, pCE allows for  the possibility  of  saving a finite total amount of 
resources by finite reallocations. 
The distinction between an exact and an approximate notion has a parallel from an 
asymptotic point of  view. A sequence of  allocations can be defined as "asymptotically eflcient'  if the per capita amount of  resources that can be saved by some improving 
:reallocation shrinks to zero as the economy  becomes large.  It  can  be shown  that 
(appropriately defined)  limits of  sequences of  consumption efficient allocations are 
:FCE in the limit economy, whereas the limits of  sequences of  asymptotically efficient 
;allocations are pCE.14 
It might thus seem that in a strategic context, pCE is the concept of  primary inter- 
est, since the non-cooperative outcomes of  "asymptotically locally separable mecha- 
i~isms"  (such as finite strategic market games) are typically at best asymptotically 
efficient.  For at least two reasons, such a conclusion seems mistaken. 
First, when  C is  appropriately continuous in  a sense  that will  be made precise 
below, pCE in fact implies FCE. Since such continuity is arguably essential for the 
meaningfulness of an infinite model as a limiting representation of large finite models, 
the asymptotic point of  view lends further support to FCE. 
Secondly,  in  the important  special case  of  quasi-linear  preference domains, full 
consumption efficiency1'  is achievable in finite economies, even in dominant strategy 
equilibrium.  For this case, our FCE based results establish the unity and qualitative 
continuity between finite and infinite economies -  with the difference, of  course, that 
full Pareto efficiency is attainable only in the latter.16 
To define the concept  of  continuity relevant  to the first  point, it  is  notationally 
easiest to redefine economies as triples (.I,&, p)  and allow sets and measures of  agents 
,to vary. 
14Cf. Nehring (1997). 
' 
151n the  sense of FCE; in finitepumi-linear emnomies, it is well-known that full Pareto-efficiency 
(cannot be achieved due to  the unavoidability of some surplus of the transferable commodity. 
''For  symmetric mechanisms, this point has been made before by Makowski-Ostroy (1992). Definition 7  (I1,&I,p1)  is a  J-perturbation of  (I,&,p) if  I'  2  I and I' \ I can 
partitioned into sets { Fj)  j,J  with the following properties: 
f 
£(i) .if2 E I 
i)  E1(i) =  , 
&(j)  if  i E F, 
22)  pl(H n  I)  = p(H  fl  I)  for all H, pl(&) > 0 for all j E J, and 
222)  i E Fj *  C(I1,E1,p')(i)  = C(I1,  &I, pl)(j). 
-  (I,&+)  is a point of continuity of  C if, for every finite subset J of  I,  there exists 
a sequence of  J-perturbations  (Ik,Ek,pk)  such that pk(Fj) converges to  zero for all 
j E J and such that C(j)(Ik,&k,pk)  converges to  C(j)(I,&,p) for all j E J.17 
Observation 2 If  C satisfies pCE  at (I,£,p)  and at all suficiently small J-perturbations 
of  (I,£,p), for all finite J c I,  and if  (I,C,p) is a point of  continuity of  p, C(I,&,p) 
satisfies in fact FCE. 
Proof. For any J-perturbation, pCE implies the absence of improving reallocations 
among the agents in J. By the openness of  preferences and continuity of C at p, this 
absence carries over to the limit. This implies FCE since J can be chosen arbitrarily. 
7.  DEFINING FEASIBILITY AND EFFICIENCY IN LARGE 
ECONOMIES 
-  It is generally  understood that in  large (non-atomic continuum) economies, one 
/ 
must define and interpret notions of  feasibility and efficiency with care. In particular, 
it  is  clear  that the following two definitions  jointly  rule out  the existence  of  any 
efficient allocation. 
17A similar assumption of continuity has been made by Makowski and Ostroy (1992). 
2 3 Condition 1  (Standard Feasibility)  fdp  <  wdp. 
Condition 2  (Naive Efficiency) For no  feasible g, gi t,  fi  whenever  gi  # fi. 
(Again, we will concentrate on exchange economies; the first condition is merely a 
restatement of  feasibility given allocation of  endowments w.) 
The standard move to rescue existence has been to require that the  set of improving 
agents have positive measure. While in most applications this approach has delivered 
sound results, this is much less clear in the present context (as pointed out in section 
5). Moreover, from a conceptual point of view, the standard approach restricts mean- 
ingful trade to infinite sets of  agents, which, at least for notions of  consumption  effi- 
ciency (and, analogously, for notions of  blocking by coalitions in core settings), seems 
economically unattractive:  however large the economy, the most plausible coalitions 
to trade/block are ones that are small in absolute size, indeed of  small finite cardinal- 
ity such as two.  (A more radical interpretation of  continuum economies holds that 
all meaningful statements in the continuum require an "up to measure zero" clause; 
however, on  such an interpretation, even  the notion of  strategy-proofness  becomes 
problematic or at least loses transparency.) 
In the following, we will take a closer look at the interpretation of  measure-theoretic 
definitions of  feasibility and argue that, when properly interpreted, they are naturally 
complemented by  exact finitary ones (which, in  the present  paper, turn out to do 
essentially all the work). 
The first step in the argument is to recognize that the measure-theoretic definition 
of feasibility, condition 1, dyes not have the same obvious "physical"  interpretation 
for a continuum economy that it has for a finite economy.  Indeed, it is conceptually 
quite problematic when  interpreted  "naively";  it contradicts our  intuitive notions 
of feasibility and scarcity for it entails that given any feasible allocation f,  there is 
another feasible allocation g that yields greater consumption for some agent without any reduction in the consumption of  others. In a related vein, Kaneko and Wooders 
(1986) emphasize that Standard Feasibility  should  be viewed as an  "idealization" 
derive it by a limiting argument . 
A more satisfactory interpretation of  the standard definition is obtained by read- 
ing it "coarsely".  Intuitively, in an economy with an infinite number of  agents, it is 
clearly possible to increase the consumption of  a particular agent by decreasing the 
- consumption of other agents by arbitmrily small positive amounts.  A legitimate limit 
version of  this is to allow the consumption of  a particular agent to increase by a pos- 
itive non-infinitesimal amount while the consumption of  other agents goes down by 
infinitesimal but still non-zero amounts. Such reallocations could be modelled explic- 
itly in an economy in which agents' consumptions take values in  the "non-standard 
reals".  One can  view  the approach  taken  in  this paper as finessing  the move  to 
non-standard analysis by specifying agents' allocations only coarsely in terms of  their 
real  part omitting their infinitesimal part.  Thus, on a Coarse Interpretation, Naive 
Efficiency is clearly inappropriate even  if Standard Feasibility is assumed, and there 
is no need to rule it out artificially by denying the meaningfulness of  distinguishing 
between two allocations that coincide almost everywhere. 
On the other hand, on a Coarse Interpretation, the standard definition  of  Pareto 
efficiency is still clearly necessav for intuitive Pareto efficiency. That is, one will still 
want to impose the following condition which can be viewed as a  partial definition of 
Pareto efficiency for continuum economies: 
Condition 3  If f  is Pareto eficient, then there is no feasible g  such that gi  >i 
for all i E I. 
(Under monotonicity of  preferences, this is equivalent to requiring the absence 
allocations that improve a set of  agents of  positive measure and leave all other agents' 
consumptions unchanged.) The condition is valid even under a Coarse Interpretation since the strict preferences does not depend on knowledge of  the infinitesimal parts of 
agents' consumption. But the Coarse Interpretation has the non-standard implication 
that in geneml it is illegitimate to postulate that gi 2  f, implies gi  fi  ; note that 
it is precisely the absence of  this implication which eliminates the problem of  Naive 
Efficiency. 
Condition 3 is not self-evidently suficient for intuitive Pareto efficiency; in partic- 
ular, as we have argued in section 3, it fails to capture the possibility of  improving 
reallocations among a finite number of  agents.  In other words, one should also require 
the following complementary condition. 
Condition 4  Iff is Pareto efficient, then f  is FCE. 
In the context of  a Coarse Interpretation, the special beauty of  considering reallo- 
cations among finite subsets of agents is that, in this special case, one can legitimately 
identify equality of  the real parts of  consumption (of the unaffected agents) "gi  = fi" 
with equality of  their fully-specified consumption, and hence can legitimately infer 
their indifference between the allocations. 
Thus, the Coarse Interpretation yields a conceptually coherent justification of  Fi- 
nite Consumption Efficiency as a component condition of  full Pareto efficiency that 
avoids Naive  Efficiency and its paradoxes.  It allows one to refer  to allocations ex- 
actly, using measure-theoretic mathematics when appropriate without having to give 
up the notion of  a well-defined agent. APPENDIX 
Proof of  Lemma 1: 
Consider 6 : R x Rx Se x S$ -, R  defined by 
2  ad  6 is C*  with 6(0,0,  w^,  G)  = r , ,a  ~(o,o,r,p)=  -2rp.G  = 0  and g  l(o,o,~,i)=  -2rp.y^ < 
A  A  0 for all w,  y. 
By the implicit function theorem, for any u3, 9, there exists a closed ~(6~9)-ball 
around (0,  6,  5) , B~('~~)(o,  6,  g) , and a unique function h('?y^)  : BE('!Y^)(0,  6,  5) -+  R 
such that 6(a,  h(',c)(a,  G,  g,G,  9  = r2  for all a,  6,  ij  E B'(~~~)(O,  w^,  5)). 
By the connectedness and compactness of  the sets Se and S:,  it follows that there 
exists in fact  E > 0 and a continuous function h : [-E,  +E]  x Se x S:  -+ R 
such that, for all (a,G,g  E [-E,+E]  x  Se  x S:, 
i) qa,  h(~,  G9,73lc)  = r2  1 
ii) h(O,G,  9 = 0 , 
iii) h is  C"  in a with 2 Ip;,g=  0 . 
Hence by  ii) and iii), for K := max {I 2  I(G9  (  (a,w,g  E  [-E,+E]  X  Se x S:  7 
one has  1 
h(a,  w,  9 5 a2~  for all (a,  6,  E 1-E,  +EI  x S'  x s:.  (4) 
Consider  now  any  w and  y satisfying  the assumptions of  lemma 1.  If  y  = 0, 
' there is nothing to prove;  if  w = 0, the claim  is  immediate;  assume thus w  #  0 
/ 
and y # 0. By the definition of  h, for a 5 E, P 2  0, 6 E  Se,  ij E S:,  aG +  $! 
(B'  (rp) + R:)  implies h(a,  G,g  2  8. Combining this with equation (4) applied to REFERENCES 
[I] Barbera, S. and M. 0. Jackson  (1995):  "Strategy-Proof Exchange," Econometrica 
63, 51-87. 
[2] Champsaur, P. and G. Laroque (1981): "Fair Allocations in Large Economies," Jour- 
nal of  Economic Theory 25, 269-282. 
[3]-Champsaur,  P. and G. Laroque (1982): "A Note on Incentives in Large Economies," 
Review of  Economic Studies 49, 627-635. 
[4] Dubey, P., A. Mas-Colell and M. Shubik (1980):  "Efficiency Properties of  Strategic 
Market Games: An Axiomatic Approach," Journal of  Economic Theory 22, 339- 
362. 
[5] Gale, D. M.  (1980):  "Money,  Information and Equilibrium  in  Large  Economies," 
Journal of Economic Theory 23, 28-65. 
[6] Green, J. and J.  J. Laffont (1977): "Characterization of  Satisfactory Mechanism for 
the Revelation of  Preferences for Public Goods," Econometrica 45, 427-438. 
[7] Hammond, P. (1979): "Straightforward Individual Incentive Compatibility in Large 
Economies,"  Review of  Economic Studies 46, 263-282. 
[8] Holmstrom, B. (1979): "Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains,"  Econometrica 47, 
1137-1144. 
[9] Hurwicz, L.  (1972):  "On ~hformationally  Decentralized Systems," in:  C.  McGuire 
and R. Radner (eds.), Decision and Organization. Amsterdam: North-Holland. 
[lo] Kaneko, M. and M. Wooders (1986): "The Core of a Game with a Continuum of  Play- 
ers and Finite Coalitions: The Model and Some Results,"  Mathematical  Social Sciences 12, 105-137. 
[ll]  Kleinberg, N. (1980): "Fair Allocations and Equal Outcomes," Journal of  Economic 
Theory 23, 189-200. 
[12] Mas-Colell, A. (1987):  "On the Second Welfare Theorem for Anonymous Net Trades 
with Many Agents," in:  T. Groves et al.  (eds.),  Information, Incentives,  and 
Economic Mechanisms. Minneanapolis:  University of  Minnesota Press. 
[I31 Makowski,  L.  and J. Ostroy  (1992):  "Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms in Con- 
tinuum Economies: Characterization and Existence,"  Journal of  Mathematical 
Economics 21, 1-35. 
[14] Nehring, K. (1997):  "Feasibility and Efficiency in Large Economies:  A General Ap- 
proach ,"  University of  California, Davis (in preparation). 
[15] Nehring, K. (1998): "Incentive-Compatibility in Large Games", Mathematical Social 
Sciences, forthcoming. 
[16] Satterthwaite, M. and H. Sonnenschein  (1981):  "Strategy-proof  Allocation  Mecha- 
nisms at Differentiable Points," Review of  Economic Studies 47, 587-597. 